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Migrant agricultural workers provide an essential and longstanding contribution to
food security in Canada. Exploitation and rights shortfalls for these workers are welldocumented. On paper, they have rights on par with Canadian workers, but these
rights do little to address the structure and dynamics underpinning their subordination
in Canadian society. In this article, I argue that law creates a “justice gap” in the
case of these workers. Law gives rights to these workers on an individual basis
but also creates structural vulnerability which renders them unlikely to make use of
individual remedies or compliance-based systems. Rights and protection discourse
does not challenge the underlying institutional arrangements in which workers’ labour
unfreedom is maintained. I argue that the justice gap can be understood as a rule of
law problem, but that the utility of this approach is ultimately limited and direct action
by workers is more likely to address justice issues.

Les travailleurs agricoles migrants apportent une contribution essentielle et de longue
date à la sécurité alimentaire au Canada. L’exploitation et les lacunes en matière de
droits de ces travailleurs sont bien documentées. Sur le papier, ils ont des droits
équivalents à ceux des travailleurs canadiens, mais ces droits ne contribuent guère
à régler le problème structurel et la dynamique qui sous-tendent leur subordination
dans la société canadienne. Dans cet article, je soutiens que la loi crée un « vide
juridique » dans le cas de ces travailleurs. La loi confère des droits à ces travailleurs
sur une base individuelle mais crée également une vulnérabilité structurelle qui les
rend peu susceptibles d’engager des recours individuels ou de s’appuyer sur des
systèmes fondés sur le respect des dispositions législatives. Le discours sur les
droits et la protection ne remet pas en question les arrangements institutionnels
sous-jacents dans lesquels l’absence de liberté des travailleurs est maintenue. Je
soutiens que le vide juridique peut être compris comme un problème de primauté du
droit, mais que l’utilité de cette approche est en ﬁn de compte limitée et que l’action
directe des travailleurs est plus susceptible de régler les problèmes de justice.

*
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University. I would like to thank both
the academic colleagues who reviewed this article and the editorial staff at the Dalhousie Law Journal
for their excellent work.
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0LJUDQWDJULFXOWXUDOZRUNHUVLQ&DQDGD
5LJKWVZLWKRXWHTXDOLW\
(QIRUFHPHQWDJDLQVWHPSOR\HUV
5HVSRQGLQJWRWKHMXVWLFHJDS

I. 0LJUDQWDJULFXOWXUDOZRUNHUVLQ&DQDGD
In response to the persistent critique of Canada’s temporary migrant labour
programs, in 2016, a federal Standing Committee report heard evidence
from workers, industry representatives, community organizations, and
researchers on the use and impact of migrant labour in Canada. Among
the recommendations to the federal government arising from this report
are the following, of particular relevance to migrant agricultural workers:
• develop policy to prevent the use of temporary foreign workers to ¿ll
permanent labour shortages;
• “immediate steps” to remove the requirement for employer-speci¿c
work permits;
• the provision of multiple-entry work permits to seasonal migrant
workers;
• review of permanent resident policy with a view to facilitating access
to permanent residency for migrant workers who have integrated into
Canadian society and are ¿lling a permanent labour need; and
• improvement of employer monitoring and compliance regimes,
including information sharing with provinces and the establishment of
a dispute resolution mechanism for migrant workers.1
Two years after this report, the federal government had partially
undertaken one of the above recommendations. The 2018 federal budget
pledged $194.1 million to employer compliance and inspections over the
¿rst ¿ve years, and $33.19 million per year thereafter to fund compliance
and employer inspections. It also promised $3.4 million over two years
to establish a pilot network of support organizations for migrant workers
dealing with abuse from their employers, designed “to support these
workers in reporting wrongdoing and provide information on their rights

1.
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills, and Social Development
and the Status of Persons with Disabilities, 7HPSRUDU\)RUHLJQ:RUNHU3URJUDP (September 2016) at
35-39 (Chair: Bryan May).
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to temporarily remain and work in Canada free from harassment and
abuse.”2 There is no mention in budget, policy, or regulatory documents
subsequent to the Standing Committee report of attempts to provide
greater labour mobility to workers through the issuance of open or sectorspeci¿c work permits rather than the current permits, which bind workers
to an individual employer. Likewise, options for permanent residence for
returning migrant agricultural workers, or those ¿lling a permanent labour
need, do not appear in any subsequent discussions. In addition to the
regulatory exclusion of agricultural workers from permanent residence
through their categorization as “low-skilled” workers,3 a 2017 Statistics
Canada report con¿rms that only 2% of seasonal agricultural workers
eventually obtain permanent residence, while 56% of those entering
through caregiving streams do transition to permanent residence.4 Unlike
in past decades, policy discourse is now replete with the language of
“rights” and “protection,” for migrant workers, and the federal government
is allocating increased ¿nancial resources to regulatory enforcement
against employers and information sharing with the provinces. However,
the federal government leaves out the two options that would most clearly
address the structural concerns leading to the exploitation of migrant
agricultural workers, namely the provision of pathways to permanent
status and the removal of bonded work permits. The rights of migrant
agricultural workers may be increasing, but this does not correspond to an
increase in access to justice, because the underlying structure of migrant
work programs functionally limits the use of individual rights.
Canada has relied on the labour of agricultural workers through
temporary migration since 1966, when the Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Program (SAWP) started. Unique among Canadian temporary
work programs, the SAWP is founded on bilateral agreements between
Canada and sending states. It started with an agreement between Canada
and Jamaica in 1966 and grew to include Mexico as well as a group of
other Caribbean countries represented by the Organization of Eastern
2.
House of Commons, Equality and Growth: A Strong Middle Class (February 2018) at 212
(Minster: William Morneau), online (pdf): <budget.gc.ca/2018/docs/plan/budget-2018-en.pdf>
[perma.cc/HPL8-JXRQ].
3.
Sarah Marsden, “Assessing the Regulation of Temporary Foreign Workers in Canada” (2011)
49:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 39 at 41 [Marsden, “Assessing the Regulation”]; Judy Fudge & Fiona MacPhail,
“The Temporary Foreign Worker Program in Canada: Low Skilled Workers as an Extreme Form of
Flexible Labour” (2009) 31 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 5 at 11 (domestic workers are the exception to this,
as they have in recent years been able to obtain permanent residence after a number of years of work).
4.
Statistics Canada, Transition from Temporary Foreign Workers to Permanent Residents, 1990
to 2014, by Yuqian Lu & Feng Hou, in Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series, Catalogue
No 11F0019M-389 (Ottawa: Stats Can, 2017) at 8, online (pdf): <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/
pub/11f0019m/11f0019m2017389-eng.pdf?st=mgJJ9nsh> [perma.cc/V8PZ-LPA5].
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Caribbean States.5 Alongside dif¿cult, dangerous working conditions, the
racialization of workers has been endemic in this program since its origins,
and remains prevalent.6 Most Canadian provinces receive migrant workers
through SAWP, with the majority working in Ontario, Quebec, and British
Columbia. Workers are permitted to stay in Canada for a maximum of 8
months between January 1 and December 15 of the year for which they
are hired. There is no limit on the number of years for which workers can
return to Canada, and many do return for many years; in one study, 57%
of Mexican workers returned for 6 years or more, and 22% returned for
more than ten years.7 In addition to using SAWP, employers can also hire
migrant agricultural workers through the Agricultural Stream for primary
agriculture work in speci¿ed agricultural commodities.8 The number of
migrant agricultural workers is increasing: in 2017, the most recent year
for which full data are available, a total of 48,185 migrant workers entered
Canada through SAWP and the Agricultural Stream combined, which is
almost double the number recorded in 2006.9
Agricultural labour migration is one piece of a larger pattern in which
temporary labour migration provides an increasingly large proportion of
Canada’s workforce across multiple sectors and evidence that temporary
migrant workers are meeting permanent labour market needs.10 Canada’s
“general-purpose” temporary labour migration program, the Temporary
Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), like the SAWP, is premised on
5.
The included countries are: Antigua and Barbuda, Commonwealth of Dominica Grenada,
Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
6.
Leigh Binford & Kerry Preibisch, “Interrogating Racialized Global Labor Supply: Caribbean
and Mexican Workers in Canada’s SAWP” in Leigh Binford, ed, Tomorrow We’re All Going to the
Harvest: Temporary Foreign Worker Programs and Neoliberal Political Economy (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 2013) 93 at 95.
7.
Jenna Hennebry, “Permanently Temporary? Agricultural Migrant Workers and Their Integration
in Canada” (2012) 26 Institute for Research on Public Policy 1 at 13, online (pdf): <irpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/assets/research/diversity-immigration-and-integration/permanently-temporary/IRPPStudy-no26.pdf> [perma.cc/J9H7-ZLDV] [Hennebry, “Permanently Temporary?”].
8.
Employment and Social Development Canada, Hire A Temporary Foreign Worker Through
the Agricultural Stream (Overview) (Ottawa: ESDC, 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/employmentsocial-development/services/foreign-workers/agricultural/agricultural.html>
[perma.cc/RK5CA49Q].
9.
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Canada—Temporary Foreign Worker
Program (TFWP) work permit holders by province/territory of intended destination, program
and year in which permit(s) became effective, January 2015–December 2018 (Dataset) (Ottawa:
IRCC, 2017), online: <open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/360024f2-17e9-4558-bfc1-3616485d65b9?_
ga=2.64526252.2057289744.1521233311-1838033800.1501022758> [perma.cc/RWN6-XFK7].
10. Karl Flecker, “Building a Disposable Workforce Through Temporary Migration Policy” (2010)
Can Issues/Themes Can 99; Patti Tamara Lenard & Christine Straehle, eds, Legislated Inequality:
Temporary Labour Migration in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012); Kerry
Cundal & Brian Seaman, “Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Programme: A Discussion of Human
Rights Issues” (2012) 9:3 Migration Letters 201.
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workers’ temporary presence in Canada, requires employer endorsement,
and uses work permits that are bonded to a speci¿c job and employer.
The TFWP is used across various labour segments in Canada, from
upper-level white collar work to retail, food service, primary industry,
and construction. Workers classi¿ed as “high skilled” generally have
more reliable pathways to permanent residence and family reuni¿cation
than those classi¿ed as “low skilled.”11 The number of workers admitted
under the TFWP continues to outstrip the number of permanent economic
immigrants to Canada, and those classi¿ed as “low-skilled” constitute
a growing proportion of total migrant workers in what Judy Fudge and
Fiona MacPhail call an “extreme form of Àexible labour.”12 Nandita
Sharma has also documented racialization in the TFWP generally as a
mechanism of constituting “others” as part of a nationalist discourse in
Canada.13 The TFWP and the SAWP share structural features Àowing
from the legal regulation of migrant work, and in particular the limitation
of labour mobility and capacity to remain in Canada. The SAWP can be
seen as the most extreme extension of federal policies which emphasize
temporariness and exaggerate the power differential between worker and
employer. All TFWP workers are time-limited, but SAWP workers are
seasonal; all TFWP workers need an employer to endorse their permit, but
employers have a stronger role in program determination in SAWP. Added
to this dynamic is the geographic and cultural isolation of agricultural
work in rural Canada and the occupational hazards associated with farm
labour, further increasing the risk to workers in SAWP particularly. In this
paper, while I focus on the SAWP speci¿cally as one of the two programs
in which migrant workers are most vulnerable (the other being domestic
work), the analysis that follows is applicable to some degree to the TFWP
as well, and in particular to low-skilled workers in that program.
Agricultural workers in general, including migrant workers, do not
have access to standard protections of the unionization process and formal
collective action through labour law in Ontario, as they are subject to a
separate regime.14 In British Columbia, where they are not excluded

11. Marsden, “Assessing the Regulation,” VXSUD note 3 at 45.
12. Fudge & MacPhail, VXSUDnote 3 at 43.
13. Nandita Sharma, +RPHHFRQRPLFVQDWLRQDOLVPDQGWKHPDNLQJRIµPLJUDQWZRUNHUV¶LQ&DQDGD
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 4.
14. For a detailed treatment of the exclusion of agricultural workers from Ontario labour law, see
Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, &RQVWLWXWLRQDOODERXUULJKWVLQ&DQDGD)DUPZRUNHUVDQG
WKH)UDVHUFDVH (Toronto: Irwin, 2012).
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from labour law, unionization efforts have been fraught with dif¿culty.15
In addition to the problems arising within the employment relationship,
researchers have established the long-term negative impacts of the SAWP
program on migrant participants, including family estrangement16 and
long-term health problems.17 Weiler and McLaughlin have documented
the impact of SAWP participation on food security for migrant workers,
demonstrating the multiple barriers that arise for workers who live in
Canada without access to adequate kitchen and food storage facilities or
access to fresh, affordable food; ironically so, given their role in providing
food security to Canada.18 Migrant workers under these programs are
exclusively nationals of Mexico and the Caribbean, and workers are
racialized within Canada’s programs.19
The substandard living and working conditions often faced by
migrant agricultural workers in Canada are well-documented, including
unliveable employer-supplied housing, inadequate cooking and sanitation
facilities, occupational health and safety problems,20 wage theft, unlawful
termination, barriers to accessing health care,21 and racist and sexualized
harassment and abuse on the job.22 Workers sometimes pursue complaintbased remedies or engage in other forms of resistance that do not rely
on the legal system, but the ready threat of deportation and non-renewal
of permits functions to increase worker compliance through what Basok
and Belanger call “performances of self-discipline.”23 It is important
15. Leah F Vosko, “Blacklisting as a modality of deportability: Mexico’s response to circular migrant
agricultural workers’ pursuit of collective bargaining rights in British Columbia, Canada” (2016) 42:8
J of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1371.
16. Janet McLaughlin et al, “Temporary Workers, Temporary Fathers: Transnational Family Impacts
of Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program” (2017) 72:4 Industrial Relations 682.
17. Kerry Preibisch & Jenna Hennebry, “Temporary migration, chronic effects: The health of
international migrant workers in Canada” (2011) 183:9 CMAJ 1033.
18. Anelyse M Weiler, Janet McLaughlin & Donald C Cole, “Food Security at Whose Expense?
A Critique of the Canadian Temporary Farm Labour Migration Regime and Proposals for Change”
(2017) 55:4 Intl Migration 4.
19.
Kerry Preibisch & Leigh Binford, “Interrogating Racialized Global Labour Supply: An
Exploration of the Racial/National Replacement of Foreign Agricultural Workers in Canada”
(2007) 44:1 Can Rev Sociology 5. See also Nandita Sharma, “On Being Not Canadian: The Social
Organization of “Migrant Workers” in Canada” (2001) 38:4 Can Rev Sociology 415.
20. Janet McLaughlin, Jenna Hennebry & Ted Haines, “Paper versus Practice: Occupational Health
and Safety Protections and Realities for Temporary Foreign Agricultural Workers in Ontario” (2014)
16:2 Perspectives interdisciplinaires sur le travail et la santé 1.
21. Jenna Hennebry, Janet McLaughlin & Kerry Preibisch, “Out of the Loop: (In)access to Health
Care for Migrant Workers in Canada” (2016) 17:2 J Intl Migration & Integration 521.
22. Kerry Preibisch & Gerardo Otero, “Does Citizenship Status Matter in Canadian Agriculture?
Workplace Health and Safety for Migrant and Immigrant Laborers” (2014) 79:2 Rural Sociology 174.
23. Tanya Basok & Daniele Belanger, “Migration Management, Disciplinary Power, and
Performances of Subjectivity: Agricultural Migrant Workers in Ontario” (2016) 41:2 Can J Sociology
139 at 141.
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not to understate workers’ successes and meaningful acts of resistance
both within and outside legal remedies. However, the subordination of
migrant workers as a group has remained a structural feature of migrant
work programs in Canada. As I revisit in detail below, temporary status,
deportability, and labour immobility, including employers’ power to
inÀuence the selection of workers’ opportunities to return underpin the
subordination of workers.24 This disjuncture arising from the operation of
law on multiple levels gives rise to a justice gap: not only a gap between
migrant workers and citizen workers, but a gap between the promise of
law and its actual functioning.
A patchwork of laws apply to migrant workers in general, although
agricultural and domestic workers have been subject to particular
exceptions, notably with regard to basic employment standards in some
provinces.25 In large part, however, migrant agricultural workers are de
jure equal to citizen workers with regard to the protection of basic working
conditions and other formal rights, but the legal institutional features of
migrant work programs create conditions under which workers’ capacity
to obtain remedies is undermined, or the available remedies are inadequate
given the differences between migrant and citizen workers, leading to de
facto exclusion. Employment standards, labour, and occupational safety
regimes tend to have no self-reÀexivity in this regard—the justice gap is
not visible within structures in which workers are implicitly assumed to
have citizenship. An exception to this is found in provincial human rights
law in Canada, in which there has recently been a turn toward the analysis
of the structural features of migrant work programs that create workers
vulnerability and the relationship between migration status and grounds
such as sex and race, for which human rights law provides protection
against discrimination.26 Despite this, the promise of individual remedies

24. Jill Lindsay Harrison & Sarah E Lloyd, “Illegality at Work: Deportability and the Productive
New Era of Immigration Enforcement” (2012) 44:2 Antipode 365. See also Tanya Basok, Danièle
Bélanger & Eloy Rivas, “Reproducing Deportability: Migrant Agricultural Workers in South-western
Ontario” (2014) 40:9 J Ethnic & Migration Studies 1394.
25. See, e.g., Industries and jobs with exemptions or special rules, 4 January 2019, online: Ontario
Ministry of Labour Exemptions Tool <www.ontario.ca/document/industries-and-jobs-exemptionsor-special-rules> [perma.cc/7CFP-64G3] (in 2018, an overhaul of employment standards legislation
brought domestic workers within full coverage of the Employment Standards Act for the ¿rst time).
Agricultural workers in British Columbia are exempt from several standard protections: see Farm
Workers Factsheet, July 2016, online: British Columbia Employment Standards <www2.gov.bc.ca/
gov/content/employment-business/employment-standards-advice/employment-standards/factsheets/
farm-workers> [perma.cc/VJJ9-WHAT].
26. See, e.g., CSWU Local 1611 v SELI Canada Ltd, 2008 BCHRT 436; T(OP) v Presteve Foods
Ltd, 2015 HRTO 675 at para 216; Monrose v Double Diamond Acres Ltd, 2013 HRTO 1273; PN v FR,
2015 BCHRT 60 at para 92; Ben Saad v 1544982 Ontario Inc, 2017 HRTO 1.
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LQKXPDQULJKWVLVOLPLWHG,QKHUDQDO\VLVRIUHFHQWKXPDQULJKWVFDVHV
%HWKDQ\ +DVWLH QRWHV WKDW KXPDQ ULJKWV WULEXQDOV DUH WDNLQJ DFFRXQW RI
³WKH XQGHUO\LQJ VWUXFWXUDO LQHTXDOLW\ EHWZHHQ QDWLRQVWDWHV WKDW JLYHV
ULVHWRWKHQHHGWRPLJUDWHIRUODERXUWKHUHJXODWRU\VWUXFWXUHJRYHUQLQJ
PLJUDQWODERXUDQGWKHUDFLDOL]DWLRQRIPLJUDQWZRUNHUV´DQGFRQQHFWLQJ
WKHVHIDFWRUVWR¿QGLQJVRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQDJDLQVWLQGLYLGXDOZRUNHUVDQG
DVVRFLDWHGUHPHGLHV+RZHYHU+DVWLHFRQFOXGHVWKDWVXFKUHPHGLHVFDQ
SOD\³RQO\DVPDOOUROHLQVROYLQJZKDWLVDPXFKODUJHUSUREOHP´EHFDXVH
ZKLOH WKH\ DFNQRZOHGJH WKH LPSDFW RI VWUXFWXUDO IHDWXUHV WKH\ GR QRW
DGGUHVVWKHPGLUHFWO\+XPDQULJKWVUHPHGLHVDUHGRPHVWLFUHWURDFWLYH
DQG IRFXVHG RQ PHDVXULQJ KDUP WR DQ LQGLYLGXDO ZKHUHDV WKH V\VWHPV
JLYLQJ ULVH WR GLVFULPLQDWLRQ DUH IXQGDPHQWDOO\ WUDQVQDWLRQDO UHTXLUH
SUHYHQWDWLYHDFWLRQDQGLPSDFWPLJUDQWZRUNHUVFROOHFWLYHO\
,QGHVFULELQJWKHJDSEHWZHHQde jureDQGde facto ULJKWVIRUPLJUDQW
DJULFXOWXUDO ZRUNHUV -DQHW 0F/DXJKOLQ DQG -HQQD +HQQHEU\ XVH WKH
PHWDSKRURIDURSHUHSUHVHQWLQJIXOOFLWL]HQVKLSWRZKLFKPLJUDQWVKDYH
DFFHVVWRDIHZVWUDQGVEXWQRWWKHIXOOVWUHQJWKRIWKHURSH¶VIDEULF7KH\
DWWULEXWHWKHHOXVLYHQHVVRIULJKWVIRUPLJUDQWZRUNHUVWRWKH³GXDOSUHFDULW\
RI PLJUDQW ZRUNHUV¶ HPSOR\PHQW DQG LPPLJUDWLRQ VWDWXV´ ,Q DGGLWLRQ
WR UHGXFHG ULJKWV ³RQ SDSHU´ WKH\ OLQN WKH SUHFOXVLRQ RI ULJKWV FODLPV
de facto E\ PLJUDQW ZRUNHUV WR WKH ³KLJKO\ UHVWULFWHG DQG FRQWUROOHG´
PLJUDWLRQUHJLPHVWKURXJKZKLFKWKHVHZRUNHUVHQWHU&DQDGDLQFOXGLQJ
WKH ODZV DQG SROLFLHV WKURXJK ZKLFK WKH ULJKW WR VWD\ LQ &DQDGD FDQ EH
WHUPLQDWHGDWDQ\WLPHDQGZRUNHUV¶KRXVLQJDQGPRELOLW\DUHFRQWUROOHG
E\ HPSOR\HUV7KH\ FRQFOXGH WKDW WKH GHQLDO RI FLWL]HQVKLS WR PLJUDQW
ZRUNHUVLVDVLJQL¿FDQWIDFWRULQWKHLUH[SORLWDWLRQDQGWKDWWKHSURYLVLRQ
RI FLWL]HQVKLS RU SHUPDQHQW UHVLGHQFH VWDWXV ZRXOG DOOHYLDWH WKH ULJKWV
VKRUWIDOODVZHOODVLQFUHDVLQJSROLWLFDODQGVRFLDOLQFOXVLRQ
7KH FHQWUDOLW\ RI PLJUDQW ODERXU LQ DJULFXOWXUDO SURGXFWLRQ DQG WKH
VXEVWDQGDUGOLYLQJDQGZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQVRIPLJUDQWZRUNHUVKDYHORQJ
EHHQ MXVWL¿HG RQ WKH EDVLV RI &DQDGLDQ IRRG VHFXULW\:KLOH VRPHWLPHV
IUDPHGDV³DJULFXOWXUDOH[FHSWLRQDOLVP´UHOLDQFHRQXQIUHHPLJUDQWODERXU
 %HWKDQ\+DVWLH³7KH,QHTXDOLW\RI/RZ:DJH0LJUDQW/DERXU5HÀHFWLRQVRQ31Y)5DQG
237Y3UHVWHYH)RRGV´  &-/6 DW
 IbidDW
 -DQHW0F/DXJKOLQ -HQQD+HQQHEU\³0DQDJHGLQWRWKH0DUJLQV([DPLQLQJ&LWL]HQVKLSDQG
+XPDQ5LJKWVRI0LJUDQW:RUNHUVLQ&DQDGD´LQ5KRGD(+RZDUG+DVVPDQQ 0DUJDUHW:DOWRQ
5REHUWV HGV The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept 3KLODGHOSKLD 8QLYHUVLW\ RI
3HQQV\OYDQLD3UHVV DW
 IbidDW
 Ibid DW
 IbidDW
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is normalized in Canadian food production and enacted through law and
policy despite a recent turn to more rights talk.33 Rights and enforcement
talk is increasingly present in public and policy discourse with regard to
migrant workers in Canada. But both rights and enforcement frameworks
tend to frame workers and employers as isolated individuals. Through
well-functioning rights mechanisms, the worker becomes eligible for an
individual remedy based on the harm they can establish to themselves
personally, and the employer is named as a wrongdoer, with the implicit
assumption that the employer is an outlier.34 In enforcement mechanisms,
as well, individual employers are named publicly and subject to sanction.
Neither of these methods leaves room for examining or challenging the
conditions under which unfree labour becomes structurally embedded,
nor for examining “the role of states—especially through labour and
immigration policy—in fostering conditions in which the most severe
forms of exploitation can thrive.”35
In the following section, I will map the basic legal rights of migrant
agricultural workers and their limits in terms of the structural regulation
of migrant labour, before turning to consider whether the “justice gap”
thereby created can be addressed by a rule of law argument.
II. 5LJKWVZLWKRXWHTXDOLW\
A patchwork of laws provides rights to migrant agricultural workers
in Canada, and while the array of remedies available varies between
jurisdiction, I will use examples from Ontario and British Columbia. This
section will provide a brief map of rights and entitlements for migrant
workers, including remedies and the few available reported cases. While
there is room for improvement in the individual rights of migrant workers,
those workers are by and large included in the basic employment, human
rights, and housing standards provided by law to all workers. In other
words, the justice gap cannot be attributed to a failure to include migrant
workers in standard workplace protections.
Seasonal agricultural work programs form a standalone stream of
temporary migrant labour in Canada, based on bilateral agreements
between Canada and Mexico, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago,

33. Weiler, McLaughlin & ColeVXSUD note 18. See also Adrian A Smith, “Racialized in Justice: The
Legal and Extra-Legal Struggles of Migrant Agricultural Workers in Canada” (2013) 31 Windsor YB
Access Just15.
34. Jenna Hennebry, “Not Just a Few Bad Apples: Vulnerability, Health, and Temporary Migration
in Canada” (2010) Can Issues/Themes Can73
35. Genevieve LeBaron, “Unfree Labour Beyond Binaries” (2015) 17:1 Intl Feminist J of Politics 1
at 2.
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and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.36 The legal status of
these agreements is not that of a treaty, but rather an “intergovernmental
administrative arrangement” for mutual bene¿t under which parties
undertake to resolve disputes through consultation.37 The agreements state
that workers are to receive “fair and equitable treatment while in Canada
under the auspices of the Program” in the case of Caribbean workers38
and “adequate accommodation and treatment equal to that received by
Canadian workers performing the same type of agricultural work, in
accordance with Canadian laws” in the case of Mexican workers. Employers
are not directly bound by this as they are not parties to the agreement.
However, standard form contracts for workers are attached as appendices
to the bilateral agreements, and spell out workers’ and employers’ rights
and obligations, and are intended to be signed by workers, employers,
and a consular agent of the sending government. The Mexican contract
includes a standard working day of 8 hours, with voluntary paid overtime
and a limit on “excessive hours that would be detrimental to (workers’)
health and safety”39 and overtime requests should be made “giving the
same rights to Mexican workers as given to Canadian workers.”40 Workers
must be given two breaks of ten minutes during the day, paid or unpaid
according to provincial legislation, as well as one day off after six working
days.41 Workers are entitled to pay for 40 hours per week at either the
minimum wage, the prevailing wage according to ESDC, or the rate paid
to Canadian workers, whichever is greater (except BC, which uses a piece
rate, in which workers are paid by the weight of the fruit they pick, with
the minimum wage as the Àoor).42 The contract provides that employers
may terminate workers for “non-compliance, refusal to work, or any other
suf¿cient reason stated in this agreement” (except in British Columbia).43
Employers must provide “suitable accommodation” to workers
without cost (except in British Columbia, where they may charge for

36. Hennebry, “Permanently Temporary?,” supra note 7 at 9.
37. Veena Verma, “The Regulatory and Policy Framework of the Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Program” (2017) North-South Institute 1 at 5, online (pdf): <s3.amazonaws.com/migrants_
heroku_production/datas/149/Verma_2007_original.pdf?1311694811> [perma.cc/E7ML-DK82].
38. Ibid at 7.
39. Employment and Social Development Canada, Contract for the Employment in Canada of
Seasonal Agricultural Workers from Mexico—2019 (Ottawa: ESDC, 2018), s I.3, online: <www.
canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/foreign-workers/agricultural/seasonalagricultural/apply/mexico.html> [perma.cc/GX9K-U372].
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid, s II(11-12).
42. Ibid, s III(5-7).
43. Ibid, s X(2).
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it) and subject to annual inspection by a health authority.44 In addition
to provincial reporting requirements for occupational injury, employers
must also report to the sending consulate any injuries requiring medical
attention45 and provide protective gear and equipment to workers handling
chemicals and pesticides.46 Similarly, employers must provide records of
hours and wages to the sending consulate.47 The SAWP contract purports
to bind workers to reside at the place of employment or otherwise, at the
whim of the employer,48 and to “return promptly” to their country of origin
upon completion of the work permit.49 The Caribbean contract is similar in
content, with minor variations.50
The SAWP agreements are contracts of employment between
individual workers and employers, and could thus be enforceable in any
Canadian court, but to date there are no published decisions in which
either a worker or an employer has sought to enforce their terms. Some
terms seem to invite judicial clari¿cation. For example, the concept of
‘suf¿cient reason’ for termination appears to deviate from the commonly
accepted standard of ‘just cause’ for termination in employment law. Is this
language intended to make it easier to terminate workers, and if so, would
judges countenance the application of a separate standard for migrant
agricultural workers? Likewise, the contract includes terms allowing the
employer to determine where the worker will reside and obligating the
worker to return to their home country, both of which seem to obligate
speci¿c performance beyond the employment relationship: again, would
such terms be seen as enforceable, or unconscionable, under Canadian
employment law? As I will elaborate below, it is no accident that these
terms have remained judicially unexamined, but on the face of it, there
is nothing to suggest that migrant agricultural workers are excluded from
standard common law for unfair termination of limited duration contracts,
breach of terms, or unconscionability available to all workers; in some

44. Ibid, s II(2).
45. Ibid, s V(5).
46. Ibid, s VIII(3)(b).
47. Ibid, s VU(1).
48. Ibid, s IX(6).
49. Ibid, s IX(4).
50. Employment and Social Development Canada, Contract for the Employment in Canada of
Commonwealth Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers—2019 (Ottawa: ESDC, 2018), online:
<www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/foreign-workers/agricultural/
seasonal-agricultural/apply/caribbean.html> [perma.cc/GX9K-U372].
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situations, migrant workers may also have recourse to tort claims for
breach of ¿duciary duty.51
In addition to the common law of employment, Canadian law offers
statutory minimum standards of employment in every province and
territory, providing a minimum wage, basic overtime and leave provisions,
and prohibition of unauthorized payroll deductions, among others.
Migrant agricultural workers are included in some, but not all, of these
protections, at least in British Columbia and Ontario. In British Columbia,
farm workers (including both citizens and migrants) are excluded from
overtime pay provisions, meal break requirements, minimum hours free
from work, and statutory holiday pay52 although they remain protected
from excessive hours, or hours detrimental to the worker’s health and
safety.53 While their wages are determined by piecework rates based
on weight, they are entitled to at least minimum wage no matter how
much they pick, and they are entitled to regular wage statements and
timely pay, vacation pay, and protection from unauthorized deductions
and fees for job placement, as well as a basic level of compensation for
termination without cause.54 The situation is similar in Ontario: harvesters
in fruit, vegetable, and tobacco are excluded from caps on hours of work,
mandatory rest periods, meal breaks, overtime, and statutory holiday
pay. They remain entitled to termination pay, timely pay statements,
and protection from unauthorized deductions. With regard to minimum
wage, there is somewhat less protection, as employers can bene¿t from
‘deemed compliance’ with minimum wage rules where workers are paid a
piece rate under which the worker’s ‘reasonable effort’ would amount to
minimum wage, even if the employee does not actually receive minimum
wage.55 Any worker in Ontario pursuant to a temporary work permit
program, including migrant agricultural workers, is entitled to additional
protections under the Employment Protections For Foreign Nationals
Act.56 This prohibits employers from taking passports from workers, from
charging workers for employment costs, from reprisal against workers
for complaints, and it requires employers to provide rights information

51. See Mustaji v Tjin, 25 BCLR (3rd) 220, 128 WAC 178. See also Espinoza v Canada (Attorney
General), 2013 ONSC 1506, in which the Superior Court of Ontario held that the worker had an action
for wrongful dismissal but made no decision on the merits of that action.
52. Employment Standards Regulation, BC Reg 396/95, s 34(1).
53. Ibid, s 34(1); Employment Standards Act, RSBC 1996, c 113, s 39 [BC ESA].
54. BC ESA, supra note 53, ss 10, 21, 27, 57, 63.
55. Exemptions, Special Rules, and Establishment of Minimum Wage, O Reg 285/01, s 25(2).
56. Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act (Live-in Caregivers and Others), SO 2009, c
32.
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to workers in an appropriate language if they do not speak English.57 All
of these statutes rely on workers to initiate a complaint, as do all similar
employment standards laws across Canada.
In terms of occupational health and safety, migrant agricultural workers
are generally included as workers: in British Columbia, for example,
there is no distinction based on migration status in the legislation, and
these workers can make compensation claims for injury and occupational
disease, as well as making complaints about unsafe working conditions.
In the case of compensation claims, employers and employees both have
an obligation to report workplace injuries resulting in lost time or medical
attention. Occupational health and safety issues rely on workers’ reports,
which migrant workers may be less likely to make given the stakes of
job loss and deportation. In some cases, the outcome for migrant workers
in terms of workers’ compensation is categorically diminished, due in
particular to the logic underlying loss of earnings assessments. For example,
a migrant worker’s losses would be calculated (and reduced) based on the
assumption that the worker could obtain suitable alternate employment in
Ontario, even when such employment was legally impossible (due to the
ending of a work permit and repatriation of the worker). This logic has
recently been overturned in an Ontario appeal tribunal decision, which
held that the worker’s local labour market in their country of origin is the
appropriate context in which to assess loss of earnings.58
Seasonal agricultural workers, like all workers, are also entitled to
seek compensation for loss of earnings and injury to dignity on the basis
of discriminatory conduct by an employer under human rights law. While
neither seasonal agricultural workers nor migrant workers in general have
been recognized as a protected group under human rights legislation,59
tribunals are increasingly willing to recognize the particular context of
migrant workers in fashioning remedies. In the only published example
of a human rights decision concerning a migrant agricultural worker, the
Ontario Human Rights Tribunal heard a claim from a migrant agricultural
worker who was terminated from his position and repatriated after
complaining about racial slurs from the employer. The Tribunal received
expert academic evidence on the unique vulnerabilities of migrant
workers and the connection between fear of deportation and workers’
reluctance to report workplace concerns, and considered the particular
57. Ibid, ss 8, 11.
58. Decision No 1773/17, 2017 ONWSIAT 2962.
59. “Migration status” has been rejected as a basis for protection under s 15 of the Charter (Toussaint
v Canada (MCI), 2011 FCA 213), while “citizenship” is accepted (Andrews v Law Society of British
Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1).
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vulnerability of workers in this program in issuing a remedy.60 While
human rights remedies consist primarily of compensation for injury to
dignity and lost wages, they may also include reinstatement or other jobspeci¿c remedies.61 For migrant workers, a reinstatement remedy could be
complicated by the lack of labour mobility—if they no longer have a valid
work permit under federal law, a reinstatement order would be frustrated.
Human rights remedies in both Ontario and British Columbia are based
entirely on complainant-initiated processes, and despite the availability of
compensation for employer retaliation, this, like other remedies, does not
account for deportability and lack of labour mobility.
Agricultural migrant workers are required to live on the farms where
they work, or in other housing under the control of their employers, and
concerns with unsafe and inadequate housing are well-documented.62
There are multiple sources of law which could be used to deal with housing
concerns, the ¿rst of which is the employer’s requirement to provide
‘suitable’ housing in the SAWP contract itself, and the attendant annual
inspections. While annual inspections do not require worker complaint,
the results may not reÀect the actual living conditions of workers, due, for
example, to relocation of workers by the employer to avoid the impression
of overcrowding in advance of inspections. In addition, workers who
pay rent could have recourse to residential tenancy protections, such as
those available through the Residential Tenancy Act in British Columbia.63
These include basic maintenance and sanitation standards, as well as
privacy from the employer/landlord. There are no published decisions in
which a seasonal agricultural worker has used residential tenancy law.
Once again, the process is complaint based, and damages can be limited:
while punitive awards are possible, often the only compensation is for rent
paid, which is minimal for these workers.64 Finally, some provinces have
speci¿c laws regulating the use of “work camp” style accommodation
60. Monrose v Double Diamond Acres Limited, 2013 HRTO 1273.
61. Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19, s 45.2; Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210, s 37.
62. See Adrian Smith, “The Bunk House Rules: A Materialist Approach to Legal Consciousness
in the Context of Migrant Workers’ Housing in Ontario” (2015) 52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 863. See also
Patricia Tomic, Ricardo Trumper & Luis LM Aguiar, “Housing Regulations and Living Conditions
of Mexican Migrant Workers in the Okanagan Valley, BC” (2010) Can Issues/Themes Can 78;
Mervyn Horgan & Sara Liinamaa, “The Social Quarantining of Migrant Labour: Everyday Effects of
Temporary Foreign Worker Regulation in Canada” (2017) 43:5 J Ethnic & Migration Studies 713.
63. Residential Tenancy Act, SBC 2002, c 78.
64. Migrant workers (non-agricultural) have attempted to use human rights legislation to obtain
compensation for substandard housing, on facts in which discrimination was established with regard
to employment. Chein v Tim Hortons Inc, 2015 BCHRT 169. On the facts of the case, the complaint
with regard to housing was denied by the BCHRT, but remains a possible basis for compensation
where discrimination in housing could be proven.
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WKDW LQFOXGHV IDUPV ,Q %ULWLVK &ROXPELD IRU H[DPSOH WKH Industrial
Camps RegulationHVWDEOLVKHVVWDQGDUGVIRUKHDWLQJYHQWLODWLRQQXPEHU
RI RFFXSDWLRQV VWUXFWXUDO LQWHJULW\ DQG SHVW FRQWURO ,QYHVWLJDWLRQV
DQG SRVVLEOH UHPHGLDO DFWLRQ DUH EDVHG RQ FRPSODLQW DQG DUH DLPHG DW
FRUUHFWLQJ WKH FRQGLWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ FRPSHQVDWLQJ WKH ZRUNHUV 7KHVH
UHJXODWLRQVKDYHEHHQXVHGIRUDJULFXOWXUDOFRPSODLQWVDSSUR[LPDWHO\
WLPHVVLQFHLQWKHLQWHULRUUHJLRQRI%ULWLVK&ROXPELDDQGDVXEVHWRI
WKHVHOLNHO\LQYROYHKRXVLQJFRQGLWLRQVIRUPLJUDQWZRUNHUV
:KLOH WKLV EULHI UHYLHZ RI ULJKWV DQG UHPHGLHV DYDLODEOH WR PLJUDQW
DJULFXOWXUDO ZRUNHUV LV IDU IURP D FRPSUHKHQVLYH DFFRXQW LW SURYLGHV
HQRXJKRIDSLFWXUHWRPDNHDIHZLQLWLDOREVHUYDWLRQV)LUVWWKHVHZRUNHUV
DUH E\ DQG ODUJH LQFOXGHG de jure DV ZRUNHUV²WKDW LV WR VD\ WKH\ DUH
QRWH[FOXGHGIURPHLWKHUFRPPRQODZRUUHJXODWRU\FODLPVRQWKHEDVLV
RI WKHLU VWDWXV DV WHPSRUDU\ PLJUDQW ZRUNHUV 7KH\ DUH H[FOXGHG DV
agricultural ZRUNHUV IURP FHUWDLQ IDFHWV RI HPSOR\PHQW VWDQGDUGV EXW
VHHLQJ WKH VHW RI SRWHQWLDOO\ DSSOLFDEOH SURWHFWLYH ODZV DV D ZKROH WKLV
H[FOXVLRQ LV WKH H[FHSWLRQ QRW WKH UXOH 6R LQ DW OHDVW WKLV PRVW IRUPDO
VHQVH PLJUDQW DJULFXOWXUDO ZRUNHUV DUH ³ULJKWVEHDUHUV´ LQ WKH UHDOP RI
ODZ¶VSURWHFWLRQRIZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQVKHDOWKDQGVDIHW\KXPDQULJKWV
DQGKRXVLQJ3XWDQRWKHUZD\WKHODZFDQQRWEHLPSOLFDWHGDVDVRXUFHRI
LQHTXDOLW\in terms of the legislative or judicial exclusion of these workers
from speci¿c legal remedies. )RU UHDVRQV WKDW , ZLOO GHWDLO EHORZ WKHVH
SURWHFWLYHIHDWXUHVDUHUDUHO\XVHG7KHUHVXOWLQJJDSEHWZHHQWKHSURPLVH
RI LQGLYLGXDO ULJKWV DQG WKH DFKLHYHPHQW RI de facto HTXDOLW\ LV RQH LQ
ZKLFKWKHODZ¶VUROHVKRXOGEHFDUHIXOO\H[DPLQHGLIRQHDJUHHVDV,GR
WKDWSDUWRIODZ¶VSURPLVHLVDFRQFHUQIRUMXVWLFH
3DUWRIWKHUHDVRQIRUWKHDEVHQFHRIHIIHFWLYHUHPHG\LQWKHVLWXDWLRQ
RI PLJUDQW ZRUNHUV LV QRW XQLTXH WR WKLV JURXS EXW FDQ LQVWHDG EH VHHQ
DVDVKRUWFRPLQJRIFRPSOLDQFHEDVHGUHPHGLHVIRUZRUNHUVSDUWLFXODUO\
ZKHUH WKH\ UHO\ RQ ZRUNHU FRPSODLQW %DVHG RQ KHU ¿HOGZRUN ZLWK
ZDJHWKHIWFDVHVLQ2QWDULR/HDK9RVNRFRQFOXGHVWKDW³KHDY\UHOLDQFH
RQ FRPSOLDQFH RYHU GHWHUUHQFH LV XQOLNHO\ WR HIIHFWLYHO\ SUHYHQW RU
UHPHG\ >HPSOR\PHQW VWDQGDUGV@´ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI LQFUHDVLQJ SUHFDULW\
IRU ZRUNHUV DQG WKDW WKLV HPSKDVLV RQ FRPSOLDQFH FUHDWHV ³D VLWXDWLRQ
 Industrial Camps Regulation%&5HJ
 5HFRUGVRIUHSRUWVDQGLQVSHFWLRQVXQGHUWKHIndustrial Camps RegulationSURYLGHGWRWKHDXWKRU
RQ  -XO\  E\ ,QWHULRU +HDOWK LQ UHVSRQVH WR D UHTXHVW XQGHU WKH Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act56%&F3DUW ,+ 7KHUHSRUWVGRQRWUHFRUG
PLJUDQWZRUNHUVWDWXV2WKHUUHJLRQVKDGQRWSURYLGHGGDWDE\WKHWLPHRIZULWLQJ
 )RUIXUWKHUHODERUDWLRQRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQODZDQGMXVWLFHVHHHJ-HUHP\:DOGURQ
³'RHV/DZ3URPLVH-XVWLFH"´  *D6W8/5HY
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in which employers who violate the ESA and are caught can expect that
in most cases the worst that will happen is that they will be required to
pay what they owe.”68 Furthermore, she notes, the risks to workers of
initiating a complaint “are shaped by the social location of the claimants,”
giving the example of migrant workers whose permits are tied to a speci¿c
employer, and who therefore fear loss not only of employment, but of their
status in Canada, as reprisal for making complaints against an employer.69
While Vosko’s ¿eldwork was speci¿c to the employment standards
context, these arguments are equally applicable to the procedurally similar
mechanisms attached to human rights, housing, and occupational health
and safety complaints, and the risk to workers in terms of reprisal would
be indistinguishable as between statutes. Even for those statutes in which
there is compensation for employer reprisal, this would be cold comfort to
a worker deprived of their livelihood, or their migration status.
In addition to problems with compliance-based systems for workers
at large, other areas of Canadian law contribute to the unequal position of
migrant workers and effectively undermine the potential of rights remedies.
The federal Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and its regulations
create a taxonomy of status and structural employment vulnerabilities for
migrant workers against which even the most inclusive of rights remedies
are limited at best. Deportability is a part of this; workers who are temporary
face a risk of removal, because they are in Canada as a matter of privilege,
not a matter of right, as compared to permanent residents and citizens.70 The
stakes are therefore not only higher, but of a completely different nature.
For migrant agricultural workers speci¿cally, there is also a real risk of not
being retained or recalled to work in subsequent seasons, otherwise known
as “blacklisting,” a disciplining response in which the government of
Mexico has also been complicit as a sending state. In her detailed account
of actual blacklisting in agricultural work, Leah Vosko documents both
threats of blacklisting and acts of blacklisting by employers and Mexican
consular of¿cials in response to unionization efforts. Blacklisting as a
form of deportability effectively limits the exercise of labour rights by
workers, but also serves the interests of employers and both state parties
in maintaining the status quo: a “model” migration program in a “climate

68. Leah F Vosko et al, “The Compliance Model of Employment Standards Enforcement: An
Evidence-based Assessment of its Ef¿cacy in Instances of Wage Theft” (2017) 48:3 Industrial
Relations J 256 at 270.
69. Ibid at 264. See also Fay Faraday, Pro¿ting from the Precarious: How Recruitment Practices
Exploit Migrant Workers (Toronto: Metcalf Foundation, 2014).
70. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, ss 11, 29 [IRPA].
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of fear” is institutionalized for workers.71 Compounding the vulnerability
engendered by deportability is the closed work permit system: based on a
protectionist policy impulse, migrant workers are limited to working for a
single employer (unless they have that employer’s support to move), in a
single position, and therefore lack basic labour mobility.72 These workers
provide unfree labour in contrast to citizen workers, permanent residents,
and open work permit holders.73 Researchers have also explicated how
status precariousness is institutionalized in immigration law, as it is easy to
lose status, and dif¿cult to maintain or restore it.74 Finally, immigration law
creates a distinction between “high-skilled” and “low-skilled” workers;
the former have access to permanent residence, family accompaniment,
and family reuni¿cation, whereas the latter generally do not.75
In the case of migrant agricultural workers speci¿cally, the legal
limitations on labour mobility and migration status exist to provide
stability in labour supply for food production and remittances to sending
countries, and are established through long-term bilateral agreements for
the movement of labour. As many others have noted, the very features of
the legal arrangements which make migrant workers desirable as a stable,
Àexible work force in food production serve as strong disincentives to
the pursuit of individual rights-based remedies. Risks of deportation, nonrecall, and loss of income are simply not accounted for in rights remedies
because the necessity of temporary, Àexible labour is naturalized in
Canadian and global political economy. While it is important to recognize
the individual victories of workers and their advocates in using rightsbased protections, the resulting gains should not be overstated in assessing
the role and potential of law; it is an example of situation in which rights
exist but “the framework is not compatible with the problem.”76 The
71. United Mexican States v British Columbia (Labour Relations Board), 2015 BCCA 32; Leah
Vosko, “Blacklisting as a Modality of Deportability: Mexico’s Response to Circular Migrant
Agricultural Workers’ Pursuit of Collective Bargaining Rights in British Columbia, Canada” (2016)
42:8 J Ethnic & Migration Studies 1371 at 1382.
72. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 203 [IRPR].
73. See Aziz Choudry & Adrian A Smith, eds, Unfree labour? Struggles of Migrant and Immigrant
Workers in Canada (San Francisco: PM Press, 2016). See also Kendra Strauss & Siobhán McGrath,
“Temporary Migration, Precarious Employment and Unfree Labour Relations: Exploring the
‘Continuum of Exploitation’ in Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program” (2017) 78 Geoforum
199.
74. Luin Goldring, Carolina Berinstein & Judith K Bernard, “Institutionalizing Precarious Migratory
Status in Canada” (2009) 13:3 Citizenship Studies 239.
75. Sarah Marsden, “Assessing the Regulation of Temporary Foreign Workers in Canada” (2011)
49:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 39.
76. Sally Merry, “Inequality, Gender Violence, Human Rights” in Simon Archer, Daniel Drache &
Peer Zumbansen, eds, The Daunting Enterprise of Law: Essays in Honour of Harry Arthurs (Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017) at 302.
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liberal gesture is pervasive—the language of equity, protection, and rights
appears in the bilateral agreement between governments, the workers’
contract, and the multiple protections to which workers have de jure
recourse—but, without a substantive linking of these three sources of law
and their underlying political economy, rights statutes alone are ineffective
in improving the material conditions of workers in a systemic way.77 The
federal government’s recent response to ongoing rights shortfalls in the
migrant worker program has as its centrepiece a new enforcement and
compliance system, to which I will turn in the next section.
III. Enforcement against employers
In 2015, Canada’s federal government made changes to the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations in which speci¿c workplace rights
were linked with the migrant labour program for the ¿rst time. Until
recently, the federal government disclaimed responsibility for protecting
migrant workers because employment standards were a matter of provincial
jurisdiction. Short of actually breaching the Act or Regulations, for example
by hiring unauthorized workers, employers were not accountable within
the prior framework for the treatment or working conditions of migrant
workers; under previous regulations, employers’ responsibility was
limited to compliance with the conditions speci¿ed in the labour market
assessments under which they had hired workers. Compliance checks were
undertaken only for returning employers, evidence was sought primarily
from employers, and remedies were focused on ‘education’ of employers,
rather than deterrence.78
The new compliance and enforcement system is much more
extensive in both scope and remedy. Employers of all migrant workers
with employer-tied work permits are now also required to comply with
“federal and provincial laws that regulate employment, and the recruiting
of employees,”79 which clearly includes provincial employment standards
and occupational health and safety laws, and arguably also includes
the sections of provincial human rights laws that apply speci¿cally to
employment. However, the mention of provincial standards does not
mean that federal agencies will enforce provincial standards. Instead,
federal sanctions are triggered once a provincial agency (such as the

77. Daiva K Stasiulis, “International Migration, Rights, and the Decline of ‘Actually Existing
Liberal Democracy’” (1997) 23:2 J Ethnic & Migration Studies 197.
78. Employment and Social Development Canada, Integrity Operations Manual—Chapter 63—
Temporary Foreign Worker Compliance Reviews (Ottawa: ESDC, 2013) at 4. This document was
provided on request under the Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1.
79. IRPR, supra note 72, s 209.2(1)(ii).
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British Columbia Employment Standards Branch) has completed its
process and found an employer in breach of employment standards. In
effect, employers of migrant workers found in breach of provincial
standards may face additional penalties federally. Employers must also
“make reasonable efforts to provide a workplace free of abuse,” with
abuse de¿ned as including physical, sexual, psychological, and ¿nancial
abuse.80 The scope of investigative power is also signi¿cantly expanded:
rather than simply requesting documentary evidence, federal agents can
question employers, conduct on-site inspections, and enter workplaces
without a warrant, triggered by a “reason to suspect” the employer is noncompliant.81 Inspections can be based on public (or worker) complaints
through tip lines, on the employer’s previous record, or based on random
selection; by some reports, there is already backlash from agricultural
employers in response to compliance inspections.82 Consequences for
noncompliant employers include monetary penalties of up to $100,000,
ineligibility periods in which migrant workers cannot be hired (up to a
permanent ban) and online publication of the employer’s name and
noncompliance.83 Based on numbers provided by the responsible federal
agencies, thousands of inspections are undertaken annually. As of 1 April
2018, a total of 50 employers had been subject to penalties under this
regime, of which 26 were subject to monetary penalties (up to $54,000 in
one case, but with the vast majority under $2000), and 24 were subject to
a two-year ban on hiring migrant workers.84
Two of the penalized employers are farms, one of which appealed,
giving rise to the only judicial consideration of this regulatory system
so far. In the Farms case, a federal investigator found Obeid Farms in
breach of multiple requirements, including failure to pay workers on a
timely basis and to provide a rest period, improper deductions, and failing
to make reasonable efforts to provide a workplace free of abuse.85 The
employer argued that the pay and working hours breaches were justi¿ed
because they arose from unintentional administrative errors.86 The Court
80. Ibid, s 196.2.
81. Ibid.
82. Canadian Agricultural Human Resource Council, A Review of Canada’s Seasonal Agriculture
Worker Program (Ottawa: CAHRC, 2017), online (pdf): <cahrc-ccrha.ca/sites/default/¿les/EmergingIssues-Research/A%20Review%20of%20Canada%27s%20SAWP-Final.pdf>
[perma.cc/G8XDXFLS].
83. IRPR, supra note 72, Schedule 2.
84. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Employers Who Have Been Non-compliant”
(2008),
online:
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/work-canada/
employers-non-compliant.html> [perma.cc/FD63-GVLH].
85. Farms v Canada (Employment and Social Development), 2017 FC 302 [Farms].
86. IRPR, supra note 72, ss 203(1.1), 209.3(3)-(4).
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XSKHOGWKHLQYHVWLJDWRU¶V¿QGLQJVZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHVHEUHDFKHVKROGLQJ
WKDWWKHMXVWL¿FDWLRQSURYLVLRQVZLWKLQWKHHQIRUFHPHQWUHJLPHDUHWREH
VWULFWO\LQWHUSUHWHGVWDWLQJ
>@ LW LV WKH &RXUW¶V YLHZ WKDW WKH MXVWL¿FDWLRQ SURYLVLRQV PXVW EH
VWULFWO\ LQWHUSUHWHG«7KH LQWHQWLRQ RI 3DUOLDPHQW LQ HQDFWLQJ WKHVH
SURYLVLRQVZDVWRSUHYHQWDEXVHRIKLJKO\YXOQHUDEOHWHPSRUDU\IRUHLJQ
ZRUNHUV JLYHQ WKH WHQXRXV FLUFXPVWDQFHV RI WKHLU HPSOR\PHQW ZKLFK
ODFNWKHQRUPDOVDIHJXDUGVSUHYHQWLQJDEXVHRWKHUZLVHDYDLODEOHWRPRVW
&DQDGLDQZRUNHUV
>@*LYHQWKHSXUSRVHDQGFRQWH[WRIWKHMXVWL¿FDWLRQSURYLVLRQVWKH
&RXUWLVWKHRSLQLRQWKDWDJRRGIDLWKMXVWL¿FDWLRQFDQRQO\DULVHZKHUH
WKH QRQFRPSOLDQW FRQGXFW FDQ EH VHHQ WR EHQH¿W WKH ZRUNHU DQG LV
LQ WKH ZRUNHU¶V EHVW RU GHVLUHG LQWHUHVW 2WKHUZLVH WKH MXVWL¿FDWLRQ
SURYLVLRQVZRXOGEHXVHGWRFLUFXPYHQWDVFKHPHZKLFKPXVWEHVWULFWO\
LQWHUSUHWHG

7KH &RXUW JDYH WKH VSHFL¿F H[DPSOH RI SURYLGLQJ FDVK DGYDQFHV WR
ZRUNHUV ZKLFKLVDEUHDFKRIFRQGLWLRQVLIQRWDJUHHGWRLQZULWLQJ DV
RVWHQVLEO\ LQ WKH ZRUNHUV¶ EHQH¿W DQG WKHUHIRUH SRWHQWLDOO\ MXVWL¿DEOH
5HPRYLQJZRUNHUV¶RQO\FRQWUDFWXDOUHVWGD\KRZHYHUFRXOGQRWEHVHHQ
DVEHQH¿FLDOWRZRUNHUVDQGFDQQRWEHVXEMHFWWRMXVWL¿FDWLRQRQWKHEDVLV
RIDQXQLQWHQWLRQDOEUHDFK
:LWKUHJDUGWRWKH¿QGLQJRIWKHHPSOR\HU¶VIDLOXUHWRPDNHUHDVRQDEOH
HIIRUWVWRSURYLGHDZRUNSODFHIUHHRIDEXVHWKH&RXUWIRXQGWKHUHGRHV
QRWQHHGWREHHYLGHQFHRIDEXVHLQRUGHUWR¿QGDEUHDFKEXWDOVRWKDW
WKHHPSOR\HUGRHVQRWKDYHDQREOLJDWLRQWRSURYLGHDZRUNSODFHIUHHRI
DEXVH VLPSO\ WR PDNH UHDVRQDEOH HIIRUWV ,Q WKLV FDVH WKH &RXUW IRXQG
WKDWWKHLQVSHFWRUKDGHIIHFWLYHO\FRQGHPQHGWKHHPSOR\HUIRUQRWPDNLQJ
FRQFUHWHHIIRUWVVXFKDVXVLQJSROLFLHVDQGVWDIIWUDLQLQJWRSUHYHQWDEXVH
ZLWKRXWPDNLQJLWFOHDUZKDWFRQVWLWXWHG³UHDVRQDEOHHIIRUWV´7KH&RXUW
WKHUHIRUH TXDVKHG WKLV DVSHFW RI WKH LQVSHFWRU¶V GHFLVLRQ UHWXUQLQJ LW
IRU UHGHWHUPLQDWLRQ FODULI\LQJ WKDW WKH SURSHU LVVXH WR EH GHWHUPLQHG LV
³ZKDW HIIRUWV WKH >HPSOR\HU@ XQGHUWRRN WR SURYLGH D ZRUNSODFH IUHH RI
DEXVHDQGZKHWKHULQWKH>HPSOR\HU¶V@FLUFXPVWDQFHVWKHVHHIIRUWVZHUH
UHDVRQDEOH´
7KH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI HQIRUFHPHQW SRZHUV SURYLGHV DQ DGGLWLRQDO
YHQXH IRU WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI PLJUDQW ZRUNHUV²DQG DV FOHDUO\ VLJQDOOHG
E\ WKH )HGHUDO &RXUW WKH VWUXFWXUDO YXOQHUDELOLW\ RI WKHVH ZRUNHUV FDQ

 )DUPVVXSUDQRWHDWSDUDV>HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO@
 ,ELGDWSDUDV
 ,ELGDWSDUD
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be considered in interpreting the new rules. The new enforcement
system responds only partially to Vosko’s critique of compliance-based
mechanisms: it still proceeds on the basic assumption that non-compliance
is exceptional and provides the potential for defences on the basis of
unintentional breaches; in fact, the regulation itself makes clear that the
intention of these changes is “to encourage compliance with the provisions
of the Act and these Regulations and not to punish.”90 Many of the actual
¿nancial penalties have been small and may not deter. The new system
relies in part on evidence and reports from workers, whose deportability
may render them reluctant to disclose employer wrongdoing.
On the other hand, strict limits on employer defences, unannounced
inspections independent of worker complaint, and potentially heavy
penalties may act as deterrent features, notwithstanding the fact that this
is fundamentally a compliance model. Only further experience will show
whether there is a deterrent effect, or whether employers integrate this as
part of the cost of doing business, outweighed by the bene¿ts of Àexible
migrant labour. As I have argued elsewhere, this enforcement system also
fails to take adequate account of the particular vulnerabilities inherent in
the relationship between migrant workers and their employers.91 In this
way, the burden of enforcement still rests unduly on the workers, and this,
too contributes to the justice gap. As is the case with rights, the gesture
of protection ¿gures heavily in both legislative provisions and the single
instance of judicial consideration. While this may mean gains in working
conditions on some farms, like individual employment rights, it does
nothing to challenge the sources of worker vulnerability that give rise to
the very problems it purports to address. Further research is required to
determine whether the penalties have a deterrent effect on employers, as
well to measure the actual impact of these regulations on workers. And
perhaps most importantly, the legal constructs giving rise to temporariness,
deportability, and labour immobility remain unchallenged in the new rules,
limiting their potential to address the justice gap for migrant workers.
IV. 5HVSRQGLQJWRWKHMXVWLFHJDS
In the foregoing sections, I have set out a few immediately visible forms
of law as they concern migrant farmworkers. There is an obvious tension
between GH MXUH rights inclusion and employer compliance regimes
on the one hand, and immigration law’s categorical subordination of
migrant agricultural workers on the other. The rights gesture is important
90. ,535, VXSUD note 72,s209.94.
91. Sarah Marsden, “Who Bears the Burden of Enforcement?” (forthcoming, Canadian Lab & Emp
LJ, 2019).
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in Canada, as in any liberal democracy, but legal rights do not serve as
a mechanism for change on a large scale for migrant workers; at best,
rights-based remedies can take note of the underlying conditions, but they
do not pose an effective challenge to those conditions or the role of law
and state in creating them. The material conditions of migrant workers are
cemented by federal immigration law and policy that create and maintain
unfreedom through temporariness, deportability, and labour immobility.
In the words of Adrian Smith, if we wish to contest the subordination
of migrant workers, “the task here is to push beyond general recognition
of the existence of unfree labour to address the speci¿c mechanisms of
incorporation deployed by participating capitalist states.”92 The GHIDFWR
denial of rights occurs on the basis of institutional arrangements backed
by law and policy which are not within the ambit of individual rights or
employer sanctions. Rights and sanctions are in effect a concession to
workers in a system in which deportability, temporariness, and labour
immobility, of which contribute to labour unfreedom for migrant workers,
are considered to be unchangeable and necessary features of labour
migration in Canada’s economy.
Recent labour scholarship rejects the idea of free/unfree labour as a
strict binary, characterizing it instead as a spectrum.93 Genevieve LeBaron
situates increasing labour unfreedom as an aspect of deepening neoliberal
policy on a global scale, and notes the concentration of unfree labour
in migrant populations.94 Judy Fudge argues that traditional Marxist
and liberal theory has underestimated the role of law in shaping forms
of unfreedom, and cautions against seeing labour unfreedom as the
result of individual culpability but instead understanding it as the result
of “systemic and institutional features of state policies and practices
relating to immigration and labour regulation combined with the ‘free
market’ behaviour of employers.”95 While the underlying structures
remain unchallenged, the justice gap between the promise of rights and
sanctions and their limitations will not be closed by more individual rights,
better access to existing rights, or more sanctions. Rather the justice gap
signals the need to challenge this naturalization of labour unfreedom
and the speci¿c legal and institutional forms it takes in Canada. Beyond
documenting the limits of legal remedies, I am interested in holding law
(and the state) accountable for the subordination of migrant workers
92. Smith, VXSUDnote 33 at 29.
93. See, e.g., Lebaron, VXSUDnote 35; Judy Fudge, “Modern Slavery, Unfree Labour and the Labour
Market: The Social Dynamics of Legal Characterization” (2018) 27:4 Social & Leg Studies 414.
94. Lebaron, VXSUDnote 35 at 12.
95. Fudge, VXSUD note 93.
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and understanding how the present institutional arrangements might be
challenged. Rather than framing this accountability in terms of failing to
extend the same rights to all workers, I suggest that we must go one step
further and hold law accountable as a mechanism for labour unfreedom,
which forms the underlying basis for the relative impotence of rights. The
ways of doing so might include both those that address the state directly,
and those which seek justice beyond or outside the state.96 In either case,
I proceed on the basis that justice requires more than the redistribution
of resources (or rights), but must provide reprieve from oppression, with
the latter understood broadly in terms of exploitation, marginalization,
powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.97 These are amply
documented in the case of migrant workers, and as results of the SAWP
program in particular. I propose that any potential response to the justice
gap, whether addressed to the state or otherwise, should be measured in
terms of its potential to facilitate change in institutional arrangements
such as to remove structurally-based oppression. Here it is not possible to
interrogate all options, but I start with a principle whose value is uncontested
from the state perspective, namely the rule of law. I hope to move from
a critique of the failure of rights to an understanding of law’s potential,
or lack of potential, in fashioning meaningful responses to inequality,
with the assumption that in order to be meaningful, such responses must
have real potential to re¿gure the underlying institutional arrangements
through which labour unfreedom is generated. In this paper, I ¿rst consider
whether rule of law arguments can form the basis for robust critique and a
shift in the underlying institutional arrangements through which the state
regulates the work and lives of migrant agricultural workers. I conclude
that rule of law arguments provide an incomplete response to the justice
gap with regard to the regulation of migrant workers, and brieÀy canvass
non-state-facing forms of action as alternative, and potentially more
potent, responses.

96. Here I have not addressed the potential of international law, but with regard to the rights of
migrant workers it is likely to be quite limited; while the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and
Regulations must be applied in a way that “complies with international human rights instruments to
which Canada is signatory” (IRPA, supra note 72, s 3(3)(f). See also de Guzman v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 436. Canada has not signed the most relevant treaty: the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families. For a detailed treatment of the potential of international law’s application to migrant
workers in Canada, see, e.g., Judy Fudge, “Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment:
The Paradox of International Rights for Migrant Workers” (2011) Metropolis Working Paper Series,
online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1958360> [perma.cc/DR3X-PC77].
97. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University,
1990) at 64.
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Do the contradictions between the promises of individual rights GH
MXUH and theirGHIDFWRpreclusion through the legal structuring of labour
unfreedom amount to a rule of law problem? Without wading too far into
the rich debates on the appropriate de¿nition of the rule of law, it can be
understood in a thin or strictly formal sense in which the legal system
meets certain criteria, regardless of the content of the laws themselves.
Such criteria might include clarity, stability, the creation of laws through
properly authorized means, the subjection of all individuals and the state to
the power of law, and the availability of court review.98 In a similar vein, Lon
Fuller enumerated the requisite eight features to govern good lawmaking
(which he characterized as procedural, but some view as substantive),99
namely: generality, publicity, clarity, consistency, feasibility, constancy,
prospectivity, and congruence. The requirements of the rule of law can
also be understood in a thicker, more overtly substantive sense, either by
requiring that positive law recognize certain rights100 or through features
that are said to be intrinsic to the functioning of law such as justice,
equality, or fairness. The latter position does not necessarily dictate the
content of the law, although it does acknowledge “abstract substantive
values” at its core.101
Audrey Macklin notes that because the rule of law is determined by
jurisdiction, and not citizenship, its reach extends to non-citizens subject
to Canadian law (or the relevant law in any national jurisdiction), but that
there are nonetheless observable “distortions” in the rule of law in the case
of non-citizens.102 Macklin’s analysis identi¿es two “constitutive features
of contemporary sovereignty” that are key to understanding the relative
weakening of the rule of law with regard to non-citizens: territoriality
and status.103 Macklin focuses to a large degree on interactions at the
territorial border; for example, she documents the RCMP’s recent actions
in interrogating would-be refugee claimants, including on the basis of
religious practices and political activity. This expression of discretionary
authority at the physical border is founded on the state’s power to refuse
admission to non-citizens, to attach “what conditions it pleases” to the

98. Paul P Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical
Framework” (1997) PublicL 467 at 468.
99. David Luban, “The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: Re-examining Fuller’s Canons” (2010) 2
Hague Jl on the Rule of Law, 29 at 31.
100. Craig, VXSUDnote 98 at 473.
101. ,ELGat 477.
102. Audrey Macklin, “Citizenship, Non-Citizenship and the Rule of Law” (2018) 69:1 UNBLJ
(2018) 19 at 22.
103. ,ELG at 55.
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entry of non-citizens, and to remove non-citizens at will.104 In essence,
the state’s expression of control over non-citizens in terms of entry to and
presence in Canada tends to erode the rule of law insofar as it justi¿es
uses of discretion that would not be acceptable in the case of non-citizens.
Actions by state of¿cials that seem arbitrary or have no statutory basis
(such as the questioning of refugee claimants as to their feelings about
women who do not cover their heads, and other clearly Islamophobic
questions) demonstrate not an “outright negation” of the rule of law
with regard to non-citizens, but rather situations in which the rule of
law becomes less potent. This is underpinned by a narrowing of review
potential, which, in Macklin’s view, falls short of the requirements of the
rule of law in terms of the susceptibility of state actions to review under
law. This is so because while a non-citizen can apply for judicial review
of any decision under immigration law, they require leave from the court
to do so; Macklin argues that this leaves the process subject to a “culture
of suspicion” amongst judges with regard to the merit of claims, and does
not satisfy the basic requirement of reviewability.105
While Macklin focuses in large part on examples from the operation
of the physical border, the same analysis applies with regard to noncitizens within Canada. While they have already entered Canada, both
status and territoriality justify distinct forms of discretion that, as at the
border, are founded on the expression of sovereignty through ultimate
control over the conditions applied to non-citizens’ presence in Canada,
and underpinned by the state’s authority to deport. The argument here is
not that the state should not issue conditions or have the authority to deport
(although this premise is corollary to the more assertive forms of open
borders arguments), but rather that the rule of law tends to be less potent
in the same sites in which the state exercises control over membership,
either at the border or inside Canada. Exclusion of non-citizens does not
occur only at the territorial border. This is consistent with the work of
Bridget Anderson (among others)106 who argue that borders also exist
within the state, by way of social, legal, and physical exclusion. Migrant
agricultural workers in Canada are included in most individual rights,
but excluded as members in other ways through their legal status as
104. ,ELG
105. ,ELG at 26.
106. Bridget Anderson, 8V DQG 7KHP" 7KH 'DQJHURXV 3ROLWLFV RI ,PPLJUDWLRQ &RQWURO (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013). See also Gabriel Popescu,%RUGHULQJDQG2UGHULQJWKH7ZHQW\)LUVW
&HQWXU\8QGHUVWDQGLQJ%RUGHUV (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little¿eld, 2011); Sandro Mezzadra &
Brett Neilson, %RUGHU DV 0HWKRG RU WKH 0XOWLSOLFDWLRQ RI /DERU (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2013).
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temporary migrant workers in terms of deportability, limited-term status,
and labour immobility. Physically, they also are segregated: this Àows
from a requirement in the SAWP contract for workers to reside on the
farm or otherwise as determined by the employer, in employer-provided
housing. They live apart from nearby cities or towns, often without
transportation, and in some cases are actually disallowed from leaving the
farm.107 Sequestered on a private farm, or otherwise on employer-owned
private property, these workers are separated from public space and public
life, but also from public goods such as access to healthcare.108 Macklin’s
argument could also be applied to argue that the exclusion of this group
of migrant workers from Canadian society is suf¿ciently complete as to
function as a border within the state. Macklin’s point about reviewability
applies as well; the discretionary power that governs non-citizens inside
Canada Àows from the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, in which
reviewability is limited by the narrow gate of judicial leave requirement.
I suggest that the case of migrant agricultural workers provides the
strongest example of the diminishment of the rule of law with regard to
non-citizens inside Canada. The de jure inclusion of migrant agricultural
workers in individual rights on par with all workers would seem to point
away from a rule of law problem at ¿rst, the problem (with few exceptions)
is not that employment standards and similar laws do not apply to migrant
agricultural workers. By and large, they do, and as I describe above,
there seems to be increasing state interest in establishing and enforcing
sanctions against abusive employers. But the barriers to legal remedy for
these workers are themselves established through law, as well; the law
requires these workers to remain in a state of temporariness, deportability,
and labour immobility; perpetual “privilege-holders” rather than full legal
subjects.109 Are these institutional arrangements susceptible to critique due
to the diminishment of the rule of law?
If by “temporariness” one means simply the authorization to remain
in Canada for a speci¿ed period and the requirement to leave at the end
of that period, it most likely does not diminish the rule of law: this is a
discretionary decision made within a legal framework issuing permission
107. See, e.g., Amy Cohen, “’Slavery Hasn’t Ended, It Has Just Become Modernized’: Border
Imperialism and the Lived Realities of Migrant Farmworkers in British Columbia, Canada” (2017)
Acme: An Intl J for Critical Geographies, online (pdf): <www.acme-journal.org/index.php/acme/
article/view/1430/1308> [perma.cc/TWX6-LE9S].
108. See, e.g., Horgan & Liinamaa, supra note 62. See also Amy Cohen & Susana Caxaj, “Bodies
and Borders: Migrant Women Farmworkers and the Struggle for Sexual and Reproductive Justice in
British Columbia, Canada” (2018) 29 Alternate Routes 90, online: <www.alternateroutes.ca/index.
php/ar/article/view/22448> [perma.cc/S9CX-ETSC].
109. Macklin, supra note 102 at 56.
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WR HPSOR\HUV WR KLUH DJULFXOWXUDO ZRUNHUV DQG LVVXLQJ ZRUN SHUPLWV WR
ZRUNHUVWKHPVHOYHVDQGERWKDUHVXEMHFWWRMXGLFLDOUHYLHZRQDSSOLFDWLRQ
DVVXPLQJIRUWKHPRPHQWWKDWMXGLFLDOUHYLHZLVUHDVRQDEO\DYDLODEOH
FRQWUDU\WR0DFNOLQ¶VSRVLWLRQ DQGVXEMHFWWRDEDVLFGXW\RISURFHGXUDO
IDLUQHVV,IE\³WHPSRUDULQHVV´RQHPHDQVLQVWHDGWKHPDQQHULQZKLFK
SULYDWH HPSOR\HUV¶ GHFLVLRQV FDQ UHVXOW LQ UHPRYDO RI VWDWXV RU IDLOXUH
WR DOORZ ZRUNHUV WR UHWXUQ LH EODFNOLVWLQJ  WKLV VHHPV PRUH OLNHO\ WR
HURGHWKHUXOHRIODZ7KHSURJUDPXQGHUZKLFKWKHVHZRUNHUVDUHKLUHGLV
IRXQGHGRQDQDJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQVHQGLQJDQGUHFHLYLQJFRXQWULHVZKLFK
UHIHUVWRLWVHOIDVDQ³DJUHHPHQW´UDWKHUWKDQDVDQ\IRUPRIHQIRUFHDEOH
ODZDQGQHLWKHUWKLVDJUHHPHQWQRUDQ\SDUWLFXODULQVWDQFHRIVHOHFWLQJ
RUQRWVHOHFWLQJDSDUWLFXODUZRUNHULVUHYLHZDEOHLQDQ\IRUXP7KLVLV
VRQRWEHFDXVHWKHUXOHRIODZUHTXLUHVHYHU\SULYDWHH[HUFLVHRIGLVFUHWLRQ
WR EH UHYLHZDEOH LW GRHVQ¶W  EXW EHFDXVH LQ WKLV FDVH WKH H[HUFLVH RI
GLVFUHWLRQ E\ HPSOR\HUV DQG IRUHLJQ VWDWHV DUH PDQGDWRU\ SUHFXUVRUV WR
WKHH[HUFLVHRIVWDWXWRU\DXWKRULW\ZKLFKDUHKLGGHQIURPDFFRXQWDELOLW\
DQGUHYLHZ,QRWKHUZRUGVLIVWDWHSRZHULVIRXQGHGRQQRQUHYLHZDEOH
SULYDWH GLVFUHWLRQ LW FUHDWHV OHJDO WHUUDLQ LQ ZKLFK VWDWH DXWKRULW\ LV
H[HUFLVHGRXWVLGHWKHUHDFKRIWKHUXOHRIODZ7KLVLVGLVWLQJXLVKDEOHIURP
WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK HPSOR\HUV¶ QRQUHYLHZDEOH GLVFUHWLRQ LPSDFWV RQ DQ\
ZRUNHUWKURXJKWKHVLPSOHDFWLRQRISUHIHUULQJRQHZRUNHURYHUDQRWKHU
RU QRW KLULQJ D ZRUNHU IRU QRQGLVFULPLQDWRU\ UHDVRQV  ,Q WKH ODWWHU
FDVH WKH HPSOR\HU¶V GHFLVLRQ LV QRW DQ H[WHQVLRQ RI VWDWH SRZHU ,Q WKH
FDVHRIPLJUDQWZRUNHUVWKHHQGRUVHPHQWRIDQHPSOR\HULVEXLOWLQDVD
QHFHVVDU\SUHUHTXLVLWHWRWKHODERXUPDUNHWRSLQLRQSURFHVVHVWDEOLVKHGLQ
WKHImmigration and Refugee Protection ActDQGDVVRFLDWHGUHJXODWLRQV
ZKLFKLVLQWXUQUHTXLUHGWRREWDLQDZRUNSHUPLW:LWKRXWDZRUNSHUPLW
ZRUNHUVDUHLQYLRODWLRQRIWKHODZVLPSO\E\EHLQJSUHVHQWLQ&DQDGDDQG
VXVFHSWLEOHWRGHWHQWLRQDQGUHPRYDORQWKDWEDVLV)XUWKHUPRUHEHFDXVH
WKHZRUNSHUPLWELQGVWKHZRUNHUWRDVSHFL¿FHPSOR\HUDQGGRHVQRWSHUPLW
WKHPWRZRUNHOVHZKHUH LHODERXULPPRELOLW\ WKHLPSDFWRIHPSOR\HUV¶

 6HH HJ IRPA supra QRWH  V  6HH DOVR Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)>@6&5'/5 WK 
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Mexican States and
the Government of Canada Concerning the Mexican Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program
  LQ ,UPD &UX]/RSH] The Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ Program: Looking at Mexican
Participation Through a Magnifying Glass 'RFWRURI/DZV8QLYHUVLW\RI2WWDZD)DFXOW\RI/DZ
  >XQSXEOLVKHG@ RQOLQH SGI  ZZZUXRUXRWWDZDFDELWVWUHDP&UX]/RSH]B
,UPDBBWKHVLVSGI!>SHUPDFF:*=%*@7KHDJUHHPHQWLWVHOIVWDWHVWKDWLWGRHVQRWFRQVWLWXWH
DQLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUHDW\EXWUDWKHULVDQ³LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDODGPLQLVWUDWLYHDUUDQJHPHQW´DQGWKDWDQ\
GLIIHUHQFHZLOOEHUHVROYHGWKURXJKFRQVXOWDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHVOHDYLQJQHLWKHUDOHJDOYHQXHIRU
UHGUHVVQRUDQ\RSSRUWXQLW\IRUZRUNHUVWRGRVR
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discretion is further enlarged; the premise of free labour circulation that is
assumed in the standard allocation of rights and obligations to workers and
employers is obviated in the case of migrant workers.
The justice gap for migrant workers does not arise from the failure
to include them GHMXUH in basic rights accorded to all workers, but rather
from the contingency of their ability to live and work Canada, and the
strict limitation of labour mobility, in combination with the powerful role
of employers’ unilateral and unchecked discretion in the application of
state power. In a formalistic conception of the rule of law, let us say that an
exercise of discretionary authority is consistent with the rule of law where
it is legally authorized, subject to rules about the fair exercise of authority,
and made accountable to on this basis in a manner to which the legal subject
has access, whether through judicial review or otherwise. The regulation
of migrant workers in Canada, and agricultural workers most obviously,
creates a problem even in this thin understanding of the rule of law:
although the role of employers is authorized by law, employer discretion is
the lynchpin of the legal regulation of workers, and employers’ discretion
is not reviewable in any manner nor subject to rules about the fair exercise
of authority. In a more substantive understanding, the mechanisms through
which employer discretion becomes paramount could also be critiqued on
the basis of a lack of consistent application of the law, because the creation
of a separate, lower stratum of workers for whom the heightened risks
inherent in seeking redress effectively precludes consistent application of
employment and human rights laws clearly intended to cover all workers.
If this argument is correct, what would the rule of law require? At
the minimum, one would expect any exercise of employer discretion
that has an impact on the immigration status of workers to be subject to
control and review, including review mechanisms available to workers. In
a substantive understanding of the rule of law, this may not be satisfying
—if workers remain temporary, deportable, and immobile in the labour
market, any remedy to which they have access will be limited by these
features. On the “thickest” end of the spectrum, if migrant workers were
provided with open permits or permanent residence upon arrival, the
justice gap would almost certainly be reduced, if not closed. Workers or
worker collectives could be given a meaningful role in the negotiation of
the bilateral agreement, worker contracts, or the terms on which labour
is available. Similarly, the removal of employers’ control of workers’
housing, the removal of unilateral employer power to determine recall and
replacement, and recourse in Canadian law for workers whose status has
been impacted by employers or consulates would all assist in closing the
justice gap. But in a system in which the law itself is formulated to provide
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access to Àexible labour in response to a market in which unfree labour
has long been a component, a rule of law argument is unlikely to garner
these material gains and institutional changes for workers, although it may
be useful in advocating for procedural improvements. What seems likely
instead is that the legal system will continue to respond to critiques of rights
shortfalls with measures such as the new federal enforcement regime, and
other compliance-based requirements for employers, such as the Ontario
Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act and British Columbia’s
recently enacted Temporary Foreign Worker Protection Act (TFWPA). All
of these provide heightened requirements for employers in terms speci¿c
to the vulnerabilities migrant workers face; the TFWPA, for example,
forbids employers from threatening deportation or misrepresenting a
position, and requires employers of temporary foreign workers to register
with the Employment Standards Branch.112 While these may all provide
further remedies for migrant workers, they do not aim to resolve any of
the underlying institutional arrangements in which their unfreedom is
generated and maintained. It cannot be seen as suf¿cient for justice for the
state to naturalize unfree labour, imbed it in law, and then offer individual
rights de jure and retrospective compliance measures to take the edge off
and/or to promote surface or formal equality.
If a rule of law argument provides at best a partial and unsatisfying
response to the justice gap for migrant workers, and recent statutory
changes provide concessionary remedies, rather than institutional change,
how should the justice gap be addressed? Justice, whether de¿ned
redistributively or as action toward ending oppression, is broader than
the law, and power is negotiated both within and outside the bounds set
through the state’s mediation of relationships. Justice might well be met
through collective and individual worker-initiated acts of resistance and
change outside, and sometimes against, the dictates of law. Cohen and
Hjalmarson, for example, document multiple forms of everyday resistance
by farmworkers including working beyond the ambit of the work permit,
collective actions to pace work to manage employers’ expectations, adding
hours on timesheets to account for work done outside of regular hours, and

112. Bill 48 – 2018, Temporary Foreign Worker Protection Act, 3rd Sess, 41st Parl, British Columbia,
2018, ss 10, 20(c), 20(d).
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reappropriation of farm produce.113 They connect these types of worker
actions with the history of quiet resistance: acts undertaken against, or
around, structural constraints where overt resistance is impossible or
too risky. Collective action outside the scope of legally regulated labour
relations (such a general strike) would be a more overt version of the
same. In a less confrontational vein, this might include changes to nonstate relationships such as those between consumers and suppliers through
supply chain accountability and consumer awareness.114 Other forms of
collective action include grassroots organizing,115 and acts of resistance and
collective voice through art and culture.116 The demands for institutional
change, especially in the form of open or sectoral work permits and
permanent residence, continue to be sounded by frontline activists and
academics alike, but the law’s response never questions the naturalization
of Àexible, differentiated, immobile, and “temporary” labour, nor does
it become accountable for the material effects of this. Perhaps the most
satisfactory answers to the justice gap may be those in which migrant
workers exercise freedom not only in terms of labour mobility, but in terms
of the capacity to negotiate, confront, or avoid the institutional structures
that entrench oppressive conditions, and in which both workers’ allies and
the law are measured by their relationship to this struggle.
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